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ABSTRACT
Online game involves a very large number of users who are in-
terconnected and interact with each other via the Internet. We
studied the characteristics of exchanging virtual goods with real
money through processes called “real money trading (RMT)”. is
exchange might inuence online game user behaviors and cause
damage to the reputation of game companies. We examined in-
game transactions to reveal RMT by constructing a social graph of
virtual goods exchanges in an online game and identifying network
communities of users.
We analyzed approximately 6,000,000 transactions in a popular
online game and inferred RMT transactions by comparing the RMT
transactions crawled from an out-game market. Our ndings are
summarized as follows: (1) the size of the RMT market could be
approximately estimated; (2) professional RMT providers typically
form a specic network structure (either star-shape or chain) in
the trading network, which can be used as a clue for tracing RMT
transactions; and (3) the observed RMT market has evolved over
time into a monopolized market with a small number of large-sized
virtual goods providers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online game is one of the most successful applications having a
large number of users interacting in an online persistent virtual
world through the Internet [17]. Particularly, a massively multi-
online role playing game (MMORPG) is considered one of the most
popular online game genres. For example, there were about 11.7
million subscribers playing World of Warcra, one of the most
popular MMORPGs [22]. Users oen compete against and/or col-
laborate with other users to complete given missions (called quest)
while playing an MMORPG. Online game companies have typically
created various virtual goods (referred to as “virtual currency” or
“game items”) that are needed to enhance game character abilities.
In most MMORPGs, virtual goods can legitimately be handed over
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from a user to another user as a trade or gi within the game. Sim-
ilar to the real world, an economic system can be established in
the virtual world so that virtual goods can be purchased, sold or
exchanged between users [4]. Moreover, users who do not want
spend much time in playing a game but are eager to level up their
characters might spend their real money in buying virtual goods.
Such demands have led to the emergence of the exchanging mar-
ket of virtual goods with real money called “real money trading”
(RMT) [16]. We note that RMT is dierent from “In-app purchase”,
which refers to the activities to purchase virtual goods in an ocial
store.
Although RMT itself is a reasonable economic activity, the over-
production and popularity of RMT could have a negative impact
on the virtual economy and cause severe damage to the reputation
of the MMOPRG. In practice, professional cyber criminals known
as a gold farming group (GFG)—a group of users running multiple
client programs for MMORPGs on numerous machines to eciently
collect virtual goods—started to get involved in RMT transactions
in a well-organized manner. Naturally, such activities by a GFG
could discourage normal users from playing MMORPGs because
their eorts are not properly rewarded [11] and the game company
experiences monetary damage as a result [5]. Furthermore, RMT
is oen associated with other criminal activities, such as money
laundering [10], identity the [32] and cheating [6]. Because of
the double-sidedness of RMT, many online game companies have
dened a policy to ocially prevent RMT while some companies
have launched an ocial RMT service [27].
Besides, it is also important issue to monitor volumes and trends
of RMT. RMT presents the potential revenue which online game
company may get from In-app purchase. Consequently, the analysis
of RMT could be used as important data for identifying potential
consumers of virtual goods in the ocial market, understanding
user preferences for virtual goods and managing the price of the
virtual goods [23].
However, it is challenging to correctly identify RMT transactions
from a very large dataset in an MMORPG. When a user hands over
a virtual item to another user for RMT, it is dicult to distinguish
such an activity from legitimate activities (e.g., sending a virtual
item to a friend as a gi). Further, players use the real money
market outside the virtual world, so it is dicult to exactly match
user identities in the real money market with accounts in the virtual
world.
To address those challenging issues, we focused on analyzing
communities of users in a virtual goods trading network instead of
individual RMT transactions between users. Game users, who are
consumers in RMT, usually trade virtual goods with their friends
and acquaintances rather than strangers, and as such, form a highly
clustered structure in a virtual goods trading network. Moreover,
previous studies [18, 33] demonstrated that members in a GFG, who
are main providers in RMT, are also likely to form a separate com-
munity in a virtual goods trading network because a GFG member
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is obligated to frequently perform trading activities with another
member in the same GFG. at is, the trading activities between
dierent communities, especially provider communities and con-
sumer communities, may represent RMT transactions, while the
trading activities between users within a community may represent
legitimate trading activities.
Recent advances in the eld of social network analysis provided
us with the fundamental tools to detect communities in a network
and understand their characteristics beer. We used approximately
6,000,000 virtual goods trading transactions between April 2015
and June 2016, collected from more than 200,000 users in Lineage1,
one of the most popular MMORPGs in Korea, to construct a vir-
tual goods trading network. We analyzed its key characteristics
utilizing nodes to represent users and edges to represent trading
transactions (e.g., sending an item) between users, respectively. Our
key contributions are summarized as follows:
First, we detected RMT groups and estimated the size of RMT
market (e.g., the number of RMT transactions) in an online game
using community detection algorithms in a virtual goods trading
network and evaluated our estimation with the dataset crawled
from two real world RMT websites. is is a signicant advance-
ment from previous literature [11] because we divided a given
communities into more ne-grained categories based on network
structure, and analyzed users’ play styles and in-game economic
activities to identify the target groups accurately while the previous
study used trade activities only.
Seconds, we analyzed the key characteristics of the network
structure and found that star-shaped and chained structures were
typically formed for professional RMT provider groups.
ird, we analyzed the dynamics of virtual goods trading be-
haviors over time. We constructed weekly trading networks from
virtual goods trading transactions during a year. We then demon-
strated how a virtual goods trading network grows and changes
over time by visualizing the temporal changes of the network. Fi-
nally, we observed that the market has evolved into a monopolized
market with a small number of RMT provider groups.
2 RMT FLOW
RMT is an interesting economic activity because it is used to ex-
change assets in a virtual world with real world value [16]. As a
result of increasing demands from users for trading virtual goods,
RMT markets have naturally become popular in recent years, al-
though RMT is prohibited in most online game companies [15]. In
addition, by the nature of the black market, professional criminals
(i.e., GFG) have, in turn, materialized in the RMT market [13]. e
size of the RMT market is geing larger and larger, and now, is be-
coming a new industrial market. To summarize, the overproduction
of RMT is one of the serious problems that can cause imbalance
of game economy and inequality of wealth and opportunity. It
exploits the economic safety system and destroy the overall design
of player’s growth model.
Fig. 1 briey describes how GFG is organized and connected to
consumers for RMT. A typical GFG consists of a few bankers and
many gold farmers in a hierarchical manner [20]. A gold farmer is
an entity working full time playing online games in order to harvest
1hp://lineage.plaync.com/
virtual goods by using automated programs (e.g., game bots and
macros) or by hiring low-cost laborers [21]. Several gold farmers
work together as a team to accomplish challenging tasks such as
hunting a gigantic monster. A banker is an entity who gathers
virtual goods from the gold farmers in his or her own GFG and sells
it to online customers.
Brokers have emerged with the growing popularity of commer-
cial MMORPGs (e.g., “Ultima Online”, “World of Warcra” and
“Lineage”). ere are two types of brokers in the RMT transactions.
One is an in-game broker who performs intermediate trades be-
tween GFGs and customers inside the virtual world. Another is a
real world broker (i.e., RMT website) who advertises massive quan-
tities of virtual goods to customers and provides a reliable payment
system (e.g., escrow). In most cases, brokers receive a commission
from the sellers or buyers in RMT.
Figure 1: Typical ow of cash and virtual goods for RMT.
3 DATASET
We use a dataset of Lineage, which is released by NCSOFT, in this
study. It is a popular MMORPG in Korea with a long history, and it
has also English, Chinese and Japaneses versions. Various activities
performed by the user in the virtual world or state change events
are recorded in the form of a structured log through the game server
in Lineage. e game log consists of the following information.
• Time: When a specic activity or event occurs
• Location: Where a specic activity or event occurs
• User information: the user’s character ID, level, job and race,
etc.
• Event ID: An ID that identies the type of activity (hunting,
trading, item acquisition, dungeon entry, etc.) or event type
(level up, game money increasing or decreasing, etc.)
• Target user information: e other character information if the
log is related to the interaction with another user
• Detailed information: Depending on each activity type or event
type, detailed information related to the activity type or event
type
Specically, we used the game activity logs of more than 200,000
users from April 2015 to June 2016.
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4 TRADE NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR RMT
DETECTION
We propose a framework highlighting ve phases to detect RMT: (1)
Given a set of virtual goods transactions in game log les, we con-
struct a virtual goods trading network, and then nd community
structures in the constructed network; (2) Using the characteristics
of the structure of the community, we categorize the communities
into ve groups; (3) We categorize game users into seven groups
by play style in virtual world; (4) Aer analyzing the network char-
acteristics of each community type and behavior types of users
belonging to the community, we diagnose abnormal communi-
ties and detect suspected RMT group. e community groups are
tagged into provider type, consumer type and non-RMT type; (5)
When we classify communities into provider, consumer and others
groups, transactions between provider and consumer communities
are ltered out as RMT.
4.1 Construction of a virtual goods trading
network and community detection
In general, there are two types of trades in online games: (1) direct
trade and (2) indirect trade, by which one deposits goods in the
warehouse and then another retrieves it.
Given a set of trade transactions in an online game, we construct
a weighted directed network called “virtual goods trading network”.
In this network, a node represents a character (i.e., account) or
a warehouse and an edge represents a virtual goods trade. e
weight of an edge reects the number of trades between them. We
constructed a virtual goods trading network on a weekly basis
because Lineage has a weekly shutdown for its content updates
and server maintenance.
Lineage operates several game servers. Although a user has
several characters, one character should play on one game server.
All servers are disconnected, and all characters can trade items with
just others in the same server. Among y operating game servers
in Lineage, we chose one server in which RMT appears to be the
most active. From the game logs in the server, we constructed a
virtual goods trading network. Table 1 summarizes some basic
properties of the constructed virtual goods trading network.
Table 1: Summary of network characteristics of virtual
goods trading network.
Feature Value Feature Value
# of nodes 25,633 degree mean 2.125
# of edges 36,598 degree std. 10.8338
average path length 8.8283 betweenness mean 31,709
clustering coecient 0.001989 betweenness std. 464,528
When a virtual goods trading network is established, we try to
nd communities in the trading network where nodes in a com-
munity construct denser relationships than between nodes in the
remaining communities. is is a reasonable technique to detect
suspicious trading behaviors—people usually trade virtual goods
with their friends and acquaintances rather than strangers, and
thus form a highly clustered structure in a virtual goods trading
network.
Table 2: Comparison of community detection algorithms in
terms of modularity.
Algorithm ModularityMin. Avg. Max.
multilevel 0.73 0.97 0.99
fast greedy 0.71 0.96 0.99
walk trap 0.61 0.75 0.87
label propagation 0.61 0.91 0.96
infomap 0.66 0.91 0.94
To achieve this here, we tested ve community detection al-
gorithms (‘multilevel [2]’, ‘fastgreedy [9]’, ‘walk trap [28]’, ‘label
propagation [29]’ and ‘infomap [30]’) and compared their perfor-
mances based on the modularity that is a quantity that represents
how well communities are constructed [9]. As more densely con-
nected communities are formed, the modularity closes to one.
From the results of modularity tests, we selected the ‘multilevel’
algorithm. is algorithm has the highest modularity value (see
Table 2).
(a) Total network (b) Type 1
(a) Type 2 (b) Type 3
(c) Type 4 (d) Type 5
Figure 2: Visualization of community types
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(a) Community size (b) Radius
(c) Degree assortativity (d) STD of degree
Figure 3: Network characteristics of community types.
4.2 Community grouping by network structure
When community structures are found in a trading network, we
categorize those communities into several interesting groups by
their network statistics using the k-means clustering algorithm. We
used the following statistics:
Mean and standard deviation of degree centrality. e de-
gree is the number of connections that a node has to other nodes.
e degree of the community characterizes the network in such
a way that the average degree is closely related with the network
density and the standard deviation shows how evenly the degree
centrality is distributed, in other words, centralization of the net-
work.
Mean and standard deviation of betweenness. We adopt the
betweenness centrality to show the centralization in terms of infor-
mation ow. e betweenness centrality of the node implies the
ability to broker between groups. e betweenness centrality of a
node is calculated as the number of shortest paths from all nodes
to others through the target node. ese statistical features imply
that many members have the capability to eciently deliver the
asset or information within the community.
Degree assortativity coecient. Degree assortativity is a pref-
erence of the node to aach to others that are similar in terms of
degree. e value will be close to one if two or more connected
nodes have the same degree, or negative one otherwise.
Clustering coecient. A clustering coecient is a measure of
the likelihood that three nodes will become fully connected and
form a clique. We adopt the clustering coecient as a measure
of the property that all members in the community have a trade-
relationship with each other.
Radius. e radius is the longest distance path from all paths be-
tween nodes in the community. is metric shows how long it takes
to deliver information or assets to all members in a community.
Community size. To characterize the community in their scale,
we use the number of nodes in a community to derive the commu-
nity size.
According to our experiments, trading communities are clus-
tered into ve groups. Table 3 shows the number of communities
and the ratio of community members in the total number of users
participating in the virtual goods trading by community type (type
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Fig. 2 shows a visualization of the ve categorized
communities. We derive unique network topology by clustering
communities in terms of network statistics as mentioned above.
Fig. 3 shows the dierences in the network statistics by community
types.
Table 3: Community count and community member’s rate
for community types
Type 1 2 3 4 5
# of community 1 19 732 104 471
Member rate 10.21% 37.00% 33.38% 15.62% 3.78%
4.3 User grouping by play style
To further characterize communities, we investigate users’ play
style per communities. We summarized users’ play data using
features which are described in table 4 and categorized users into
seven groups by play style using k-means clustering algorithm (see
Table 5). Table 6 shows the proportions of user play styles in each
community type.
Table 4: Features for user clustering.
No. Feature
1 Play time (unit: second)
2 e number of days a user plays
3 e amount of experience a user obtains
4 e number of death
5 e number of combats against another player
6 e number of combats against monster
7 e number of dungeons a user plays
8 e number of parties a user joins
9 e number of an item was enchanted by a user
10 e number of an item was traded with another user
11 e amount of game money a user gets from other users
12 e amount of game money a user gives to other users
13 e amount of money a user obtains
14 e amount of money a user spends
15 e amount of time a user spends for shing
16 e amount of time a user spends for shopping
4.4 RMT group detection
Aer clustering communities and users, we compare users’ in-game
economic activities and the proportion of types of users in each
community type.
According to the previous study [14], providers have a unique
play style to achieve eciency. us, the analysis on play styles
could be used to detect RMT providers and consumers (see Table 6).
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Table 5: Categorization of users by play style.
Play style Description
Fisher users who focus to play for shing contents
Genuine users who enjoy various contents
Hard core users who have very high play time andvarious activities extremely
Light users who have low play time and activities
Party users who focus to party-activities
Shop host users who play shop activities heavily
Worker users who concentrate on activities forearning game money, i.e., hunting, harvesting
Table 6: Proportions of users’ play styles in each community
type.
Play style Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Fisher 13.12% 0.01% 3.83% 0.14% 16.73%
Genuine 46.67% 0.07% 18.42% 0.54% 31.99%
Hard core 0.55% 0.14% 0.22% 0.32% 0.40%
Light 21.69% 75.25% 25.79% 0.30% 26.37%
Party 2.43% 0.00% 5.97% 0.16% 2.81%
Shop host 14.21% 24.33% 21.87% 98.54% 21.15%
Worker 1.32% 0.20% 23.89% 0.00% 0.54%
We also analyze users’ in-game economic activities in each commu-
nity type (see Fig. 4). In most cases, the purpose of RMT providers is
only to make money so they did not pay to game companies, while
consumers oen pay to game company for their fun. Consequently,
the dierences in the amount of economic activities could be used
to categorize community types into consumer group and provider
group. e users in normal communities buy items from RMT
providers, thus we call the normal community the consumer com-
munity. Based on the results in Table 6 and Fig. 4, we will explain
the main characteristics of each community type and discriminate
communities into types in the following sections.
4.4.1 Type 1: giant component. e members in this type com-
prise the largest community (see Fig. 3(a)) and have the most inter-
community trades (see the center node in Fig. 5). Particularly,
the giant component has characteristics of a scale-free network
by which degree distribution follows a power-law. In a scale-free
network, the probability distribution of degree complies with Eq. 1.
p(x) = Cx−α (1)
According to this test for the community of type 1, α for giant
component ranged from 2.7 to 2.8.
e giant component also has the most ‘genuine’ players who
enjoy various game contents (see Table 6), and pay the most to
the game company among communities (see Fig. 4(c)). From above
observations, we conclude that this community is naturally formed
from normal users’ trades and is a consumer group in RMT.
4.4.2 Type 2: large star-shaped network. is type is a commu-
nity in which a few nodes are in the center and remaining nodes
trade only with center nodes. e degree of most nodes is one or
two, while the degree of the center nodes is in the hundreds. Con-
sequently, the standard deviation of the degree in this type is very
high, while degree assortativity is close to -1 (see Fig. 3(c) and (d)).
(a) Play time (b) Hourly income
(c) Payment to company (d) Earning rate/consuming
(e) In-game asset (f) In-game shop activity
Figure 4: Users’ in-game economic activities by community
types.
Previous studies [19, 20, 33] showed that gold farming groups tend
to construct communities similar to this type. e reasoning why
this type is a gold farming group follows. Gold farmers repeatedly
earn game money and items. Collected items and game money are
delivered to merchant characters, and the merchant characters sell
the items for game money. e game money from gold farmers and
the money acquired through item trade by a merchant character
ow to banking characters [19]. From this point of view, the center
node is a banker whose role is to gather and store virtual assets for
GFGs.
Characters in these communities focus on producing virtual as-
sets, however, do not consume the virtual asset in their play as
shown in Fig. 4(d)2. However, they do not possess many assets
because they frequently send bankers or consumers their produc-
tion (see Fig. 4(e)). Moreover, their payment for the game company
is lower than other communities because their purpose of game
playing is economic income by their labor, not entertainment (see
Fig. 4(c)).
ese communities are mainly composed of ‘Shop host’ and
‘Light’ type users. ‘Shop host’ users are merchant characters and
‘Light’ users are gold farmers, who have a short play time to avoid
game bot detection. ey conforms peripheral nodes from the
perspective of the network structure in Fig. 2 (c).
4.4.3 Type 3: small star-shaped network. e network structure
of type 3 is similar to type 2, but its size is smaller than type 2.
e interesting point is that the play style of this type is dierent
from type 2 in terms of play time and productivity even though
2(p − c)/(p + c), p : production, c : consumption
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the network structure is similar to type 2. is type consists of
players with more various play styles than type 2 (see Table 6). In
the economic point of view, type 3 seems to be less ecient than
type 2. Type 2 pays less for the game company, however, produces
more income than type 3. at is, users in the large star earn more
game money hourly with less play time and cost (see Fig. 4(a), (b)
and (c)). Besides, the total revenue of type 2 is much higher than
type 3. Consequently, we guess that communities of type 3 are
unspecialized and immature RMT providers, while communities of
type 2 are professional organizations.
4.4.4 Type 4: chain network. e criminal network is organized
to balance eciency and security [25]. e centralized network
has a high eciency, but weak for targeted aack [1]. According
to previous works, decentralization has also been observed to be a
key tactic adopted by members of a criminal network to reduce the
risk of targeting and asset conscation [26]. We could also observe
this decentralization in MMORPGs.
is type is a very dierent structure from the star network
and looks like peer-to-peer network. Most nodes in this commu-
nity have one or two degrees, and their connections construct a
long circular chain. A node in this type sends all items to another
node and then, aer a time the receiving node sends all of these
assets back to the other. ese trading activities form a circular
chain. Consequently, these communities have a high radius and
degree assortativity (see Fig. 3(b) and (c)). Regarding economic
activities, the characters’ focus is on playing for a long time (see
Fig. 4(a)), however, they exclude producing or consuming activities
(see Fig. 4(b) and (d)). Moreover, they pay minimal amounts to the
game company (see Fig. 4(c)). ey mostly perform an in-game
shop activity primarily buying or selling items to other characters
in the virtual world (see Fig. 4(f)). Based on these observations, we
could conclude this group is an abnormal group.
We discovered that these are arbitrage groups, who realize prot
from buying virtual items and selling them back. ey possess a
large amount of assets in order to buy bulky items at a low price,
thus this type of community accounts for the largest asset portions
in the game world (see Fig. 4(e)). is unique type community also
appears because of the game rule.
In MMORPGs, the cost to buy and sell items, i.e., real estate
rental fee, wages, distribution costs, etc, is minimal. Consequently,
a player can easily make money from arbitrage if enough in-game
currency and time is available. However, there is one limit for
arbitrage in Lineage. Lineage imposes a duty on characters if they
participate in shop activity more than forty times in a week to
prevent massive in-game shop activities. Eventually, a character
in an arbitrage group does hit the shop activity limit and sends
another character all the virtual goods obtained. e character
receiving the goods continues with the arbitrage. Aer a week,
the original character receives all items and returns to arbitrage.
Consequently, the chain network is constructed to reduce the risk
of target banning by the game company and avoid the constraint
on economic activities. We could conclude that these communities
are RMT providers as well, because they play to get a benet like
GFG.
4.4.5 Type 5: outcast communities. e play style of this type is
similar to that in type 1 (see Fig. 4 and Table. 6). However, users
in this community have trades with only one or two friends. We
conclude that users in this type are normal users who limit their
social relationship regarding trading. We ltered out their trades
from our estimation.
4.4.6 Evaluation of RMT group detection. Based on the analysis
of this step, we could detect abnormal community types and name
abnormal communities as provider of RMT by network structure.
To evaluate the detecting result, we measured the rate of users who
were banned by using game bot among users belonging to each
community type. Table 7 shows that RMT provider groups have
more banning users than other groups.
Table 7: e rate of banning users by community types
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
10.05% 65.60% 23.01% 10.64% 7.64%
4.5 RMT Estimation
In this step, we built the inter-community trading network where
nodes and edges represent communities and inter-community trade
transactions, respectively (see Fig. 5). Aer that, we extracted
trading transactions between provider communities and consumer
communities as RMT, which reaches 5% of the total transactions.
Figure 5: Inter-community trading network with nodes
(communities) and edges (inter-community trade transac-
tions).
To compare with the RMT estimation, we crawled publicly ac-
cessible RMT records between May 2015 and June 2016 from two
popular RMT websites (ItemBay3 and ItemMania4). According to
the web trac ranking website named Rankey5, ItemBay and Item-
Mania dominate the Korean RMT market, with approximately 90%
of the total trac volume for RMT websites in Korea. A typical
RMT record is composed of unit price, trade volume, game server
and trade completion time.
3hp://www.itembay.com
4hp://www.itemmania.com
5hps://www.rankey.com/
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e best way to evaluate the performance of our estimation is to
measure the precision and recall rates using the real RMT records at
RMT websites as the ground truth. When real transaction records
are not accessible, we can only approximate RMT transactions by
articles posted in RMT sites, but the approximation naturally has
error because of following reasons.
First, the trading time in RMT websites and in the game world
does not exactly coincide because the trades take place in the virtual
world and real world at dierent times. To minimize the error from
this, we used weekly based time window. If we use small time
windows (e.g. daily based, or hourly based) then it can miss RMT
record occurred in the very next time period. Seing long-term time
window for the analysis can increase the possibility of including
RMT events occurred in a short time dierence.
Second, the actual transaction volume is not precisely equal to
the volume posted on the RMT website. e volume in the article is
the maximum amount that the seller wants to trade, however, most
customers buy only part of it. We do not have the exact information
available on the transaction volume in the RMT website.
ird, there is no conrmation that the user in RMT websites is
the same user in the game even if they used the same user name.
As an alternative to the problem, we computed the correlation
coecient of weekly trade transactions between the RMT trans-
actions estimated by the proposed method and those of real RMT
records at RMT websites.
For our analysis, we categorized trades into three categories as
follows:
Intra. e trades between users in an identical community.
Inter. e trades between users in dierent communities.
Inter (RMT). e trades between RMT providers and consumers.
As we might expect, the trade transactions of “Inter (RMT)” and
RMT websites have a statistically signicant correlation, while the
correlation coecients for other categorized transactions do not
(see Table 8).
Table 8: Correlation coecient ρ of the number of trans-
actions per week with RMT websites (*: 0.05, **: 0.01, ***:
0.001).
ρ p-value
Intra -0.1280 0.3754
Inter 0.0082 0.9534
Inter (RMT) 0.4722 0.000468***
5 MEASUREMENT STUDY OF RMT
5.1 Volume of RMT
As we mentioned in the previous section, the volume of trans-
actions crawled from RMT websites could overestimate the real
transactions.
To get information on RMT volume, we analyzed the distribu-
tion of individual transaction volume. e actual RMT transaction
volume from our estimation reaches approximately 40% of the trans-
action volume in RMT websites (see Table 9). Fig. 6 shows that the
distribution of the transaction volume in the RMT websites is close
Table 9: Volume of virtual goods per transaction (.: ar-
tile, unit: game money).
Category Intra Inter (RMT) RMT website
Min. 1 50,000 500,000
1st . 25,290 5,000,000 11,000,000
Median 1,500,000 12,000,000 30,000,000
3rd . 6,315,000 32,620,000 54,380,000
Max. 1,276,000,000 300,000,000 860,000,000
Mean 10,310,000 28,520,000 57,640,000
STD 36,335,270 44,811,145 95,322,270
Figure 6: CDF of the volume of virtual goods per a transac-
tion of inter-RMT andRMTwebsite(le: original data, right:
normalized data).
Figure 7: histogram of the weekly sales per game account of
RMT provider.
to the distribution of our RMT estimation if we perform the median
normalization for the transaction volume in RMT websites.
e RMT website shows a cash price for the game money, so we
can use it to estimate the volume of seller’s sales. According to our
estimations, the total volume of RMT for Lineage is approximately
sixty millions USD per year. is is equivalent to about 25% of
Lineage’s annual sales in 2014. e seller’s average weekly sales is
about 209 USD (see Fig. 7). Among the things that we have seen, the
highest total volume per game account recorded sales of about half
million USD per year. Given the fact that RMT providers usually
operate multiple game accounts, the actual average sales per RMT
provider are likely to be larger.
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5.2 Monopoly of RMT market
In this section, we analyze how the RMT market changes over time.
Lineage consists of multiple servers; each server manages its own
virtual world with dierent history. e oldest world has been
in service for eighteen years while the youngest world has been
in service for only half a year. Interestingly, we can see that the
structures of trading networks in those servers are signicantly
dierent with elapsed time.
(a) Young server (b) Old server
Figure 8: Comparison of network structures between young
server and old server.
In Fig. 8, we can observe that many provider communities com-
pete with each other for an extensive consumer community in the
young server (see Fig. 8(a)) while a few extra-large provider com-
munities monopolize RMT in the old server (see the red circle in
Fig. 8(b)).
To analyze the temporal characteristics of virtual goods trading
networks, we traced its dynamic variations for a year (see Fig. 9).
Figure 9: Dynamics of a virtual goods trading network over
time.
Figure 10: Examples of oddly-shaped providers at old
servers on Lineage.
In the beginning, there exist many scaered local consumer
communities due to that a large number of new users join and
existing users leave the MMORPG; small-sized provider commu-
nities appear too. As time passes, the provider communities grew
bigger and bigger. Aer a certain time interval, RMT consump-
tion, which was boomed excessively in the beginning, decreases
and a signicant number of providers become extinct. Aer this
period, a few extra-large provider communities, survivors, emerge.
Finally, “winner-takes-all” phenomena (with a small number of well-
organized providers only) could be observed in the RMT market
of online games. In the process, we found several extremely large
communities having an hierarchical structure (see Fig. 10). In the
hierarchical network structure, nodes are divided into groups that
are subdivided into smaller groups. According to Clauset, Moore
and Newman’s work [8] and Xu and Chen’s work [34], a network
of association between terrorists has a hierarchical structure. e
hierarchical structure with many subgroups are eective to deliver
the order from a central node and also minimizes the risk of net-
work being collapsed even though one of subgroups are detected.
e emergence of hierarchical structure indicates that the RMT
provider communities become more systematically organized and
at the same time, to minimize the risk of revealing.
5.3 RMT network in other games
To generalize our approach and ndings from a game, Lineage,
we applied our method to other similar genre games. Fig. 11 is a
visualization of the trading network in Aion and Blade and Soul,
which are other famous MMORPGs of NCSOFT. Fig. 11 shows that
star-shaped communities, which are suspected as RMT providers,
also are discovered in trading networks of the games. We will apply
our methodology to other games’ dataset in future work.
6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before installation of a game client program, participants were
asked to acknowledge a consent form under the end user license
agreement (EULA) and domestic laws. is informed them that
their data may be used in improving the quality of the installed
game. Anonymous data samples were collected only for the pur-
pose of conducting statistical analyses. Ethical compliance of our
research went through an internal experimental review process at
our organization before it launched (IRB and equivalents).
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(a) Aion (b) Blade and Soul
Figure 11: Virtual goods trading networks in other
MMORPGs
7 RELATEDWORK
e study about RMT was originally initiated in the eld of Eco-
nomics. Huhh [16] viewed RMT in massively multi-online game
in the perspective of network externality. Huhh pointed out that
RMT has contributed to the commercial success of online games.
Heeks [14] analyzed GFG and RMT in a macroeconomic point. Ac-
cording to [14], RMT is essential to provide a channel to transfer
assets between the virtual and real world.
In this paper, we provide valuable information to prove the claims
made in previous studies. For example, Heeks [14] explained that
RMT providers pursued economies of size and scale in the RMT
market. We conrmed that this phenomenon was observed through
our analysis of the virtual goods trading networks in the real game
dataset.
Several studies analyzed the social network structures in online
games because such games provide various social activities similar
to the real world. Chung et al. [7] and Son et al. [31] studied various
characteristics of social interaction networks in MMORPG. All of
these studies could be used as a practical guide for understanding
the social relationship between users.
Keegan et al. [18] particularly explored the behaviors of GFGs
using a network analysis. ey showed similarities between a
GFG network and real world drug tracking network. is is
proof that analyzing a community network in an online game can
assist in understanding a real world community structure. Woo et
al. [33] analyzed the free money trade referring that people only
give game money without geing any goods in return for GFG
detection. Fujita et al. [11] proposed a RMT detection method
based on the observation that RMT traders tend to form dense
relationships with each other. Although their works and our work
had similar approaches in terms of analyzing trading network, we
improved the RMT detection method by considering community
network structures and member characteristics in a community
while previous studies analyzed only trade activities.
Meanwhile, we refer to many previous studies for social network
analysis. Mislove et al. [24] is a representative study for a social
network on the Internet. Yang et al. [35] proposed a spammer
detection model using network analysis in Twier. Boshmaf et
al. [3] studied the social BOT network in Facebook. Although these
studies analyzed services on the Internet, their approaches and
techniques were helpful in analyzing social networks in online
games. We believe that our work can additionally contribute to
understanding network structures of other Internet services.
8 CONCLUSION
RMT could signicantly inuence online game services. e over-
production and popularity of RMT could have a negative impact on
the virtual economy and cause severe damage to the reputation of
the MMOPRG. On the other hand, RMT presents the potential rev-
enue which online game company may get from In-app purchase.
erefore, it is critically important for game companies to estimate
volumes of RMT and monitor the trend. In practice, however, it is
very dicult to correctly distinguish RMT transactions from the
millions of transactions.
To address this problem, we propose to detect abnormal com-
munities on a trade network formed from in-game transactions.
We construct a trading network with virtual goods trading records,
split hundreds communities, detect RMT groups by characterizing
their unique network statistics and analyzing community mem-
bers’ in-game activities. We then lter out trades from RMT group,
namely RMT provider to normal groups, namely RMT consumers
and estimate the RMT volume based on ltered trades. To evaluate
our RMT provider detection, we measured the rate of users who
were banned by illegal activity (i.e. using game bot) belonging to
each community type and found that RMT provider groups have
more banning users than other types.
For practical use, we performed the experiment using large-
scale game logs from a popular online game—Lineage, one of the
most popular MMORPGs. To demonstrate the eectiveness of the
proposed method, we compared the estimation on RMT detected
from in-game log with real RMT transaction records crawled from
two major RMT websites in South Korea. rough the analysis on
a large-scale and long-term log from a popular online game, we
derived following ndings.
Professional RMT providers typically form the star-shaped net-
work, which is highly centralized with a high-degreed key node and
lots of low-degrees nodes. is shape is for ecient sales of asset;
the key node collect asset from members and sell it to other users.
We also found that chained structures in the virtual goods trading
network. is network is emerged to minimize the risk of revealing
and the damage of banning. is network structure has never been
found in previous works to our best knowledge. Additionally, we
showed several interesting results about dynamics of RMT network
via long-term analysis. As the online game become mature, the
RMT market is monopolized by a few large RMT providers. Also,
in old server, the RMT provider communities with the hierarchical
structure appear for more systematic operation. We expect that
this work is helpful to understand the underground economy in
not only an online game but also real-world. As a part of future
work, we plan to apply our methodology to other online games’
dataset to generalize our ndings.
Finally, our current analysis of RMT transactions only focused
on the online game service. We believe the proposed method might
work well for other black markets in other networks (e.g., Bitcoin
transactions in the Deep Web [12]). We will also verify this as
another part of future work.
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